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1  
China-New Zealand  Free Trade Agreement 
 Henry Gao (Published in Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio (eds.), BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES, Cambridge University Press, 2016, 77-96)  I. Introduction  Even though China and New Zealand are far apart, bilateral trade between the two countries has been growing fast. For example, while bilateral trade was only US$1.8 billion in 2003, it has more than doubled to US$3.7 billion in just four years.1 Of the total trade, exports from China contributed sixty percent, or US$2.16 billion, of total trade volume with more than half coming from two sectors: machineries and textiles. 2  Of the US$1.54 billion worth of New Zealand exports to China, the majority consisted of dairy products, wood and pulp, and wool.  As China exports more to New Zealand than the other way around, one might assume that China was the one pushing for the free trade agreement (FTA). However, for the following reasons, it seems the reverse is more likely to be true: First, the sizes of the two economies are different. While Chinese exports are bigger in absolute terms than New Zealand exports, they constitute a much smaller share of China’s total global exports due to China’s much larger size and the corresponding small size of New Zealand. In 2008, for example, 5.9% of New Zealand’s total exports were to China, making China the fourth largest export partner of New Zealand.3 In contrast, exports from New Zealand made up only 0.2% of China’s total exports, placing New Zealand 59th among China’s exporting partners.4  In other words, China is a much more important export destination for New Zealand than New Zealand is for China. Therefore, from New Zealand’s perspective, signing an FTA is a good way to lock in the Chinese export market.  Second, the initial levels of protection were different. Prior to the conclusion of the FTA in 2008, only 8.3% of China’s tariff lines were set at zero, while 57.6% of New Zealand's tariff lines were already duty-free.5 Thus, further liberalization under the FTA would bring more commercial benefits to New Zealand as the barriers were higher on the Chinese side before the FTA. In particular, China had high tariff rates for several main export items of New Zealand. For example, before its WTO accession, China’s tariff rates on dairy 
                                                 
 Associate Professor, Singapore Management University; Dongfang Scholar Chair Professor, Shanghai International Business and Economics University. Email: gaohenry@gmail.com.  1 MOFCOM, Zhongguo Xinxilan Zimaoqu : Changjian Wenti Jieda (FAQ on the Sino-New Zealand FTA), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/newzealand/newzealand_changjianwenti.shtml#q1. 2 MOFCOM, Zhongguo Xinxilan Zimaoqu : Shuangbian Huowu Maoyi ( Sino-New Zealand FTA : Bilteral Goods Trade), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/newzealand/newzealand_hwmy.shtml.  3 WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Factual Presentation: Free Trade Agreement between China and New Zealand (Goods and Services) - Report by the Secretariat, WT/REG266/1, 20 September 2010, para. 3.  4 Id.  5 WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements,  Free Trade Agreement between China and New Zealand (Goods and Services), Questions and Replies, WT/REG266/3, 8 February 2011, at p. 5.  
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2  
products were as high as 50%.6 While they have been greatly reduced after its accession, the final MFN rates in 2005 were still between 10-20%.7 At the same time, China’s dairy market has huge growth potential. In 2006, for example, China’s daily per capita dairy consumption was only 42 grams, which was not only far behind the world average of 270 grams, but also much less than the Asian average of 140 grams.8 With the rising living standards, dairy consumption was guaranteed to rise too. Compared to the domestic products, imported dairy products are not only of higher qualities, but also much cheaper.9 Thus, “the future is bright” for New Zealand dairy exporters.10   Economic modeling confirms the greater benefits to New Zealand in an FTA deal. In the FTA feasibility study jointly conducted by the governments of New Zealand and China, it was noted that:  “New Zealand’s exports of goods and services to China are expected to be between 20 to 39 percent higher than the baseline over a twenty-year period, while China’s exports to New Zealand will increase by between 5 and 11 percent above the baseline. In very broad terms, the average annual change in New Zealand exports of goods and services to China is expected to be between US$180 million and US$280 million over twenty years; for China the gain is expected to be between US$40 million and US$70 million.”11  As the economic benefits are so lopsided in favour of New Zealand, one might wonder why was China willing to enter into such a deal? In the view of the author, the following are possible reasons for China’s decision to negotiate FTA with New Zealand.  
 First is the political consideration. Since the establishment of diplomatic relationship in 1972, the two countries have enjoyed a good relationship, which is evidenced by a series of “firsts” proudly emphasized by the New Zealand government: the first Western country to conclude a bilateral agreement with China on its accession to the WTO in August 1997; the first developed economy to recognize China’s status as a market economy in April 2004; and the first developed country to start an FTA negotiation with China in November 2004.12  It is only natural to add a fourth “first” to the list by becoming the first developed country to conclude an FTA with China. Instead of trying to extract a hard bargain from China like other Western countries, New Zealand takes the softer approach. This helps to win goodwill from China and is well in line with the advice 
                                                 
6 OECD, China's Agriculture in the International Trading System, March 2001, at p. 36.  7 China’s Good Schedule annexed to Protocol of Accession , November 12, 2001.  8 KPMG, The Milk and Dairy Market in China, 2008, at p.2, http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/milk-dairy-mkt-china-0806.pdf.  9 For example, according to a news article in 2002, dairy powder imported from New Zealand cost only 16,000 Renminbi (RMB) per ton, while domestic products cost at least 26,000 RMB per ton. See Xinhua, Jinkou Naifen Jiaodong Zhongguo Naiye Shichang (Imported Milk Powder Stirs Up Chinese Dairy Market), May 28, 2002, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2002-05/28/content_412234.htm.  10 MOFCOM of China, MFAT of New Zealand, A Joint Study Report on a Free Trade Agreement between China & New Zealand, November 2004, p. 26.  11 Id, p. 85.  12 MFAT, New Zealand-China Relations: "Four Firsts", http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/3-Progressing-the-FTA/1-Why-China/Four-firsts.php.  
 3  
given by the New Zealand government to its firms doing business in China: “make friends first; make money later”.13 This probably also explains why the FTA negotiations concluded so quickly.   Second, negotiating an FTA with New Zealand creates competitive pressures among similar countries. It was not coincidence that countries like Australia, Singapore, Peru, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland all flocked to negotiate FTAs with China after the deal with New Zealand, as they wished to emulate the success of New Zealand in getting preferential access to the huge market in China. On the other hand, China also learned how to deal and negotiate with developed countries through their FTA negotiations with New Zealand. Because the imports from New Zealand are small and for the most part not in a competitive relationship with domestic firms, the impact on the domestic producers are unlikely to be major. Thus, China was able to gain valuable lessons without paying too high a price.   Third is the complementarity of the bilateral trade. New Zealand exports mainly agricultural products to China, while Chinese exports to New Zealand are mainly manufacturing products. Thus, the bilateral trade complements each other really well and is mutually beneficial to increase the trade.   II. The negotiating process  The origin for the FTA can be traced back to 2003, when China’s President Hu Jintao visited New Zealand and signed several economic agreements, including two meat access protocols, an arrangement for consultation on technical barriers to trade (TBT), a renewed Science and Technology Agreement and an Arrangement on Mutual Recognition of Academic Degrees in Higher Education. 14  In addition, President Hu agreed with New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark to launch negotiations on a Trade and Economic Cooperation Framework (TECF), which was signed on 28 May 2004.15   In the TECF, the two countries agreed to strengthen their economic and trade relationship through a variety of means, including establishing joint commissions and holding regular bilateral dialogues and consultations between relevant government agencies.16  As most of the provisions are couched in hortatory language, however, they do not create many meaningful commitments. The most concrete result of the TECF is in paragraph 10, where the parties agree to “jointly undertake a feasibility study on a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiation and enter into the negotiations as soon as possible”. In addition, New Zealand agreed, in the same paragraph, to recognize China’s market economy status and not apply a series of discriminatory trade remedy clauses in China’s 
                                                 
13 MFAT, NZ Inc China strategy: Goals and priority actions: Strategic goal – 1, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/NZ-Inc/6-Opening-doors-to-China/3-NZ-Inc-China-strategy/0-political-relationship.php.  14 MOFCOM of China, MFAT of New Zealand, A Joint Study Report on a Free Trade Agreement between China & New Zealand, November 2004, pp.9-10.  15 Id.  16 MFAT, Trade and Economic Cooperation Framework between New Zealand and the People's Republic of China. 28 May 2004, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/China/0-tecfmay04.php.  
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WTO Accession Protocol and Working Party Report.17 This was hailed by the Chinese press as a landmark breakthrough as New Zealand was the first developed country to recognize China’s market economy status. 18  China hoped that this would create a favorable precedent for other developed countries to follow, and pave the way for the effective repeal of the provision eventually.19  The FTA negotiation was officially launched by President Hu and Prime Minister Clark in November 2004, and the first round was held in December. Initially, the progress seemed to be rather slow. However, the negotiations gained new momentum in April 2006, when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited New Zealand and agreed with Prime Minister Clark to reach a deal that is comprehensive, high-quality, balanced and mutually-acceptable within 1-2 years.20 In June and August, the negotiators held two rounds of negotiations and were able to identify areas of agreements as well as differences. 21  In the next round held in October, the two countries exchanged their requests on market access for goods and services and started to seriously negotiating these issues.22 In the next 6 rounds, the negotiators intensified their work on all fronts and finally concluded the agreement in December 2007.23 The agreement was formally signed on April 7, 2008 and entered into force on October 1.   While the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of China and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) took the lead in the FTA negotiations, many other stakeholders from both countries also participated in the negotiation process in a variety of ways. Due to the differences in their political systems, the Chinese stakeholders mainly came from the other government agencies, while the New Zealand ones were mostly from the private sector. For example, at the fifth24 and eighth rounds25, China’s National Development & Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, General Administration of Customs and General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine all participated in the negotiations. Similarly, at the tenth round, China’s Ministry of Foreign affairs, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labor and Social Security, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange also joined the 
                                                 
17 For a discussion on the provisions, see Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global Trade Governance: From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker, and Maybe Rule Maker?, in Carolyn Deere-Birkbeck (ed.), Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp.162-164.  18 Xinhua, Zhongguo zai huo Sichang Jingji Diwei shang Shouci Huode  Tupo (China’s First Breakthrough in Getting Market Economy Status), April 16, 2004, http://news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2004-04/16/content_1422554.htm.  19 Id.  20 MOFCOM, Zhongguo Xinxilan Zimaoqu : Changjian Wenti Jieda (FAQ on the Sino-New Zealand FTA), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/newzealand/newzealand_changjianwenti.shtml#q1. 21 See MFAT, Seventh Round Information Bulletin, June 2006, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/China/0-june06infobulletin.php; and Eighth Round Information Bulletin, August 2006, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/China/0-aug06infobulletin.php.  22 MFAT, Ninth Round Information Bulletin, October 2006, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/China/0-oct06infobulletin.php.  23 FTA booklet, 11. See also the information bulletins on the FTA negotiation process from 2006 to 2007 at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/China/index.php.  24 Xinhua, Zhongguo Xinxilan Zimaoqu Diwulun Tanpan Jieshu (Sino-New Zealand FTA Concluded Fifth Round Negotiations), Dec 1, 2005, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2005-12/01/content_3862893.htm.  25 Department of International Trade and Economic Affairs of MOFCOM, Zhongguo Xinxilan Zimaoqu Dibalun Tanpan zai Beijing Juxing (Sino-New Zealand FTA Eighth Round Negotiations held in Beijing), August 7, 2006, http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/af/ak/200608/20060802817433.shtml.  
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negotiations.26 In contrast, the private sector and civil society in New Zealand took a keen interest in the negotiations and made many submissions to the New Zealand government, in response to the call from the New Zealand government for submissions before the start of the FTA negotiations.27  They cover issues ranging from investment,28  labor29  and environment,30 to human rights31 and minority rights.32 While it is unclear how many of the suggestions actually made their way into the final agreement, the FTA seems to enjoy wide support among major constituencies in New Zealand as it glided through its final reading in the parliament by 104 votes to 17.33    III. Substantive obligations  The FTA includes a Preamble, 18 chapters, 14 annexes, and two implementing arrangements. The noteworthy provisions are analyzed below.   1. Tariff reductions  According to GATT Art XXIV.8.(b), a Free Trade Area should eliminate duties on “substantially all the trade” between its members. While the exact meaning of “substantially all the trade” has never been clearly defined, it is generally understood in practice to mean at least 90% coverage.34   The FTA seems to satisfy the requirement, as New Zealand agrees to eliminate tariffs on all imports from China. These include 57.6% of tariff lines that were already duty-free on an MFN basis before the conclusion of the FTA, an additional 5.7% of tariff lines reduced to zero upon the entry into force of the FTA, and the remainder of tariffs to be eliminated in stages by 2016.35   
                                                 
26China News, Zhongguo Xinxilan Zimaoqu Dishilun Tanpan Juxing huo Jiji Jinzhan (Sino-New Zealand FTA held Tenth Round Negotiations, Positive Progresses Made), February 5, 2007, http://news.sohu.com/20070205/n248059807.shtml.  27 MFAT, NZ-China Free Trade Agreement Joint Feasibility Study: Public Consultation Document, June 2004, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/China/0-publicconsultationdoc.php.  28 The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, Green Party submission on the NZ/China Free Trade Agreement, May 7, 2008, http://www.greens.org.nz/submissions/green-party-submission-nzchina-free-trade-agreement.  29  New Zealand Council of Trade Unions Te Kauae Kaimahi, CTU Submission to the International Treaty Examination of the New Zealand- China Free Trade Agreement, May 2008, http://union.org.nz/policy/submission-on-the-china-free-trade-agreement.  30 Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand, Submission on the New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement, May 12, 2008, http://www.caritas.org.nz/resources/submissions/2008/nz-china-free-trade-agreement.  31 Amnesty International New Zealand, NZ-China FTA: Full of human rights promises but no substance, http://www.amnesty.org.nz/media_release/nz_china_fta_full_of_human_rights_promises_but_no_substance.  32 Fomana Capital Ltd., Submission on the New Zealand – China Free Trade Agreement, May 5, 2008, http://www.fomana.co.nz/NZ%20China%20FTA%20Submission%20Fomana.pdf.  33 MFAT, Frequently asked questions about the NZ-China FTA, http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/5-FAQ/#Signature.  34 ED NOTE: CROSS CITE TO CHAPTER IN VOL II OF COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 35 Secretariat Report, para 20.  
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On the other hand, China agrees to eliminate tariffs on 97.1% of the tariff lines36 with the following schedule: 8.4% of tariff lines that had an MFN rate of zero before the conclusion of the FTA, an additional 15.7% that became duty-free upon the entry into force of the FTA and a further 72.9% by 2019.37 The remaining 2.9% of tariff lines are mainly wood and paper products, which China agreed in its WTO accession package to not liberalize in any FTA unless they are offered on an MFN basis to all imports.38     In addition to tariffs, China also established a country-specific tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for nine tariff lines on wool and wool tops from New Zealand.39 For wool, the TRQ quantity in 2009 was 25,000 tons to increase to 36,936 tons by 2017; for wool tops the quantity in 2009 was 450 tons to rise to 665 tons by 2017.40 Both are on top of the global TRQs it maintains on an MFN basis, which means that New Zealand exporters may apply for the global TRQ as well as the country-specific TRQ. China also has global TRQs on 36 tariff lines relating to wheat, corn, rice, sugar, fertilizer and cotton.41   One might argue that China got the better deal as its total coverage is less than that of New Zealand. However, the picture is completely different if we focus on the new liberalizations that were brought about by the FTA. China expanded its duty-free list by 88.6%, which is more than twice the additional 42.4% of tariff lines that New Zealand agreed to liberalize. In addition, as China has a much lower per capita GDP than New Zealand, it is much harder for China to eliminate tariffs as its domestic industries are more likely to need protection. Moreover, for the wood and paper products, should China decide to make them duty-free in any future FTA, New Zealand would be automatically entitled to the same treatment, thus increasing the coverage to 100%. In comparison, New Zealand appears to get the better part of the bargain.  2. Non-tariff issues  In addition to tariff reductions, the FTA also includes rules on non-tariff issues, notably trade remedies measures and standards issues.   Chapter 6 addresses trade remedies. According to Articles 61-63, the Parties maintain their rights and obligations under the WTO Agreements on Antidumping and Subsidy and Countervailing Measures. Except the commitment by the Parties to eliminate export subsidies on goods exported to the other Party,42 there are no changes to the normal rules under the WTO Agreements. Since then, the two countries have initiated one 
                                                 
36 It is unclear whether the 90% coverage refers to tariff lines or trade volume. See WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of ‘Systemic’ Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements: Note by the Secretariat, WT/REG/W/37, 2 March 2000, par. 55. See Section IV below on the analysis based on trade volume.  37 Secretariat Report, para 19.  38 Working Party Report, Para. 91.  39 Secretariat Report, Para. 26.  40 Para. 27.  41 Para. 26.  42 Arts. 10.3 and 63.  
 7  
investigation each, i.e., China’s investigation against New Zealand methanol imports in 200943 and New Zealand’s investigations against Chinese wire nails in 2010.44  For safeguard measures, however, the Parties introduce two new mechanisms in addition to the existing Safeguard mechanism under the WTO.  First, under Section 2 of Chapter 6, the Parties may maintain a bilateral safeguard measure against the other Party only. Designed to address serious injury that may be caused by the tariff reductions under the FTA, such measure may be applied during a transition period of three years from the date of entry into force of the FTA, or from the year the tariff is reduced to zero plus two years for the products whose duty will only be removed in 2012 or later.45 The measure may take the form of either suspension of further tariff reduction or reverting back to the applied MFN rate. The safeguard measure may be applied for two years with the possibility of a one-year extension, but it cannot continue beyond the expiration of the transition period for the product. Also, compensation must be provided by the Party applying the safeguard measure, otherwise the exporting Party may retaliate by suspending its concessions granted to the other Party. The bilateral safeguard measure cannot be combined with a global safeguard measure on the same product.46   Second is a Special Agricultural Safeguard mechanism, which is found not in Chapter 6 but Article 13 and Annex 2. This safeguard is unique in several aspects. First, it can only be used by China against New Zealand exports, but not the other way around. Second, the products subject to the safeguard are limited to 11 tariff lines of dairy products. Third, it can only be invoked when New Zealand exports exceed certain pre-defined trigger levels, which range from 1,300-2,451 tons for fresh milk to 95,000-197,498 tons for milk power and gradually increase annually. The safeguard measure shall not exceed the MFN rate or the base rate, whichever is lower. Once applied, it must terminate by the end of the calendar year in which it is applied. Moreover, the measure cannot be combined with the global safeguard measure or the bilateral safeguard measure mentioned above.   After the contaminated milk scandal in China in 2008, the demand for imported milk, especially New Zealand milk, soared.47 Coupled with the mid-term review mechanism for milk powders,48 the dairy special safeguard mechanism helped China to alleviate its concerns that the New Zealand dairy products would flood its domestic market and destroy its domestic industry. As of 2011, the special dairy safeguard mechanism has 
                                                 
43 Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports, Ministry of Commerce of China, Fanqingxiao Diaocha (Antidumping investigations), http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/201109/20110907745531.shtml.  44 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment of New Zealand, Investigations into Goods Dumping or Subsidisation, http://www.med.govt.nz/business/trade-tariffs/trade-remedies/dumping-of-imported-goods/investigations-into-goods-dumping-or-subsidisation.  45 Article 66. See also footnote 15 in the CRTA Secretariat Report.  46 Art. 68.3.  47 Global Times, Demand for Foreign Milk Powder Brands Soars, February 4, 2010, http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/society/2010-02/503514.html 48 Art. 14 & Annex 3.  
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been invoked seven times, 49  but the bilateral safeguard mechanism has not been invoked.50   Standards issues are addressed in Chapters 7 and 8, which deal with sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and technical barriers to trade issues respectively. In addition to affirming the rights and obligations under the corresponding WTO agreements, the two Chapters also provides for the importing Party to recognize the regulations of the other Party as equivalent to its own if they achieve same level of protection.51 One example is the Agreement between New Zealand and China in the Field of Conformity Assessment in Relation to Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Components, which allows New Zealand exporters to apply the China Compulsory Certification (CCC) mark to products before the products are exported to China, on the basis of accreditations and conformity assessment procedures carried out by New Zealand agencies which have been formally accepted in China.52 It is of historical significance as this is the first agreement under which Chinese authorities accept the results of testing, inspection and certification by Conformity Assessment Bodies accredited in another jurisdiction.53  To minimize the negative impacts of SPS measures on bilateral trade, the SPS Chapter also requires the Joint Management Committee to establish for each Party a priority list for consideration of market access requests of the other Party, including the undertaking of risk analyses.54 The list was first compiled in June 2009 in Implementing Arrangement Chapter 7B (1) and updated a year later.55 The Parties have reached several arrangements, covering mainly fruit exports from China and animal products from New Zealand.   To ensure the smooth implementation of the SPS Chapter, the FTA also grant the Parties the right to audit and verify the procedures of the other Party,56 as well as the right to conduct checks on imported animal or plant products from the other Party.57  In 2009 and 2010, for example, Chinese experts conducted verification visits to New Zealand germplasm centers, persimmon orchards and meat plants.58   3. Trade in Services  A. Market Access  Trade in services issues are addressed in Chapter 9, which is supplemented by Annex 8 containing the Parties’ services commitments schedules.  Consistent with the cautious 
                                                 
49 Section 2.2, 2-Year Review Joint Report.  50 Section 5.2.  51 Art. 81, 95 & 97.  52 Section 7.5, 2-Year Review Joint Report. See also, NZMFAT, Mutual Recognition Agreement on Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Components (MRA), available at http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/1-Key-outcomes/1-Goods/6-Technical-barriers-to-trade/mra.php.  53 NZMFAT, Mutual Recognition Agreement on Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Components (MRA).  54 Art. 79.2.  55 Section 6.3, mid-term review.  56 Art. 82.  57 Art. 84.  58 Section 6.6, mid-term review.  
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approach by China on services trade liberalization, the schedules take the “positive-list” approach rather than the “negative-list” approach found in many services PTAs. Thus, it is not surprising that the services commitments are rather modest. According to a report by the WTO Secretariat, China’s schedule mostly mirrors that of its WTO Schedule.59 Only one new sector (recreational, cultural and sporting services) not found in the GATS schedule has been added in the FTA schedule, while improved commitments are only made in four sectors, i.e., business services, education services, environmental services and transport services.60 New Zealand’s schedule is quite similar, as it includes only one new sector (environmental services), and improved commitments in three sectors, i.e., business services, construction and related engineering services, and education services.61  Qualitatively speaking, the commitments by New Zealand are more substantial than those by China. Most of the new commitments in China’s FTA schedule just relax the equity cap for New Zealand service providers by allowing wholly-foreign owned enterprises, but they do not add new subsectors or new modes of supply.62 In contrast, the schedule by New Zealand includes not only many new sub-sectors, but also undertakes full commitments for all modes except Mode 4 in most of these sub-sectors.63   In addition to the sector-specific commitments, the FTA also includes substantial commitments on the movement of natural persons, which are contained in a separate chapter and its related Annexes. These commitments fall under two categories.  First, temporary entry of natural persons, which is defined as “entry by a business visitor, an intra-corporate transferee, an independent professional, a contractual service supplier, or an installer or servicer, as the case may be, without the intent to establish permanent residence and for the purpose of engaging in activities which are clearly related to their respective business purposes”.64   Second, temporary employment entry of natural persons, which is defined as “entry by a natural person of a Party, including a skilled worker, into the territory of the other Party in order to temporarily work under an employment contract concluded pursuant to the law of the receiving Party, without the intent to establish permanent residence”.65   There are several important differences between the two categories.First, strictly speaking, only temporary entry qualifies as movement of natural persons, which is defined in the GATS as the supply of a service “by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member”. As elaborated by the Annex on Movement of Natural Persons, such natural persons should either be “service suppliers of a Member”, or “employed by a service supplier of a Member, in 
                                                 
59 Secretariat Report, paras. 87-94.  60 Table IV.3.  61 Table IV.4.  62 Paras. 88-92. See also Annex 8 Part A: China Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services.  63 Paras. 96-99. Annex 8 Part B: New Zealand Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services 64 Art. 125.  65 Art. 125. 
 10  
respect of the supply of a service.”66 In contrast, natural persons who seek temporary employment entry are employed by service suppliers in the host country. Thus they are explicitly excluded from the coverage of Mode 4, because the GATS “shall not apply to measures affecting natural persons seeking access to the employment market of a Member”.67  Second, temporary entry is not sector-specific and applies to all services sectors included in each Party’s schedule.68 On the other hand, temporary employment entry only applies to specific occupations that are listed in Annex 11. The commitments can be further divided into two groups. The first is called China Special Work Category.69 It covers up to 800 skilled workers in five occupations with a quota of 100-200 workers for each occupation. These occupations include traditional Chinese medicine practitioners, Chinese chefs, Mandarin teaching aides, Chinese "Wushu" martial arts coaches and Chinese tour guides. They are China-specific and unlikely to be replicated in other PTAs concluded by New Zealand. The second group is the China Skilled Workers Category.70 It is much broader and covers skilled workers in specified occupations in which New Zealand has an identified skills shortage. An exchange of side letters by the Parties identified twenty eligible occupations, which mainly include engineers, nurses, teachers, mechanics and electricians.71 The overall quota for the second group is 1,000 and there is no occupation-specific quota like the first. The list of occupations is not fixed and subject to the review by the Committee on the Movement of Natural Persons once every five years.   Third, on temporary entry, both Parties made commitments. However, for temporary employment entry, only New Zealand made commitments.   Fourth, in terms of duration, temporary employment entry allows workers to stay for up to three years, but no extension is allowed. In contrast, the durations of stay for temporary entry range from three months to three years, but there are no restrictions on extensions or reentry.   Another concession made by New Zealand is the Working Holiday Scheme, which allows Chinese citizens aged between 18 and 30 years to stay in New Zealand for up to 12 months. Their primary intention shall be holiday in New Zealand, but they can also engage in temporary employment to supplement their income. The employment may be in the services sector, but it can also be in manufacturing or agricultural activities.72 The annual quota for this scheme is 1,000.   
                                                 
66 Annex, Art. 1.  67 Annex, Art. 2.  68 Art. 129.3.  69 www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/stream/work/worktemporarily/requirements/chinaspecial.htm.  70 http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/stream/work/worktemporarily/requirements/chinaskilled.htm.  71 Secretariat Report, para. 83, especially footnote 24. See also, NZMFAT, Skilled workers side letter, http://chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/20-Annexes/0-downloads/skilled-workers-side-letter.pdf.  72 Key outcomes: Services: Temporary entry and employment, http://chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/1-Key-outcomes/2-Services/4-Temporary-entry-and-employment/.  
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To facilitate the movement of natural persons, the Parties also agree to process the applications for immigration formalities from natural persons of the other Party in an expeditious manner.73  In particular, within ten working days of the submission of a complete application, the authorities shall inform the applicant the result or advise when a decision will be made.74 In addition, New Zealand has made separate commitments for two special categories: first, Chinese students who wish to study in New Zealand universities will receive a decision within ten working days upon the submission of a complete application; second, a special group transit visa is created for Chinese tourists who visit New Zealand as part of a tour group.75 These two measures help New Zealand to export its educational services and tourism services to China. For example, in 2009, Chinese visitors to New Zealand numbered only 107,541. This increased to 222,720 in 2013. Similarly, China has jumped from the fourth largest source of tourists to New Zealand in 2009 to the second in 2013.76  While these commitments look nice on paper, their real impacts have been uneven. For example, among the five occupations under the China Special Work Category, all 200 places for Chinese chefs were filled by September 2011.77 To manage demand, another 33 places were made available in April 2013.78 In contrast, the uptake of the opportunities under the other four occupations has been rather limited.79 While the global recession has been cited as a main reason,80 the fact that these sectors serve mainly niche markets which have yet been sufficiently developed in New Zealand is probably a better explanation.   B. Rules Issues  The rules clauses in the FTA mostly follow the GATS. For example, the provisions on national treatment, MFN, market access, and domestic regulations copy the relevant GATS provisions almost word by word. Even on issues without existing rules in the GATS such as domestic regulations, subsidies and safeguards, the FTA explicitly provides for the incorporation of disciplines that WTO Members might adopt in future GATS negotiations.81  Nonetheless, there are still several provisions that differ from the GATS. One example is Art. 111.3, which deals with licensing procedures. Under the corresponding GATS provision, the licensing authorities are only required to provide two pieces of information: 
                                                 
73 Art. 128.1 74 Art. 128.2.  75 Annex 12: Visa Facilitation.  76 Statistics New Zealand, International Visitor Arrivals to New Zealand: June 2013, Table 4: Country of residence of visitors, Year ended June 2009–13, available at http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/population/Migration/international-visitor-arrivals-jun-13.aspx.  77 Immigration NZ, http://www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/stream/work/worktemporarily/requirements/chinaspecial.htm.  78 Id.  79 Mid-term review, Section 9.7.  80 Id.  81 Art. 111.4 on the incorporation of future GATS disciplines on domestic regulation, Art. 119.1 on the incorporation of future GATS rules on subsidies, and Art. 121 on the incorporation of future GATS rules on safeguards.  
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the status of the application, and the ultimate decision.82 In contrast, Art. 111.3 goes much deeper by adding two substantive obligations:  a. “in the case of an incomplete application, at the request of the applicant, identify all the additional information that is required to complete the application and provide the opportunity to remedy deficiencies within a reasonable timeframe”; b. “if an application is terminated or denied, to the maximum extent possible, inform the applicant in writing and without delay the reasons for such action. The applicant will have the possibility of resubmitting, at its discretion, a new application.”  These rules are similar to the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, which was developed by the Working Party on Professional Services and adopted by the Council for Trade in Services in 1998. 83  However, there are some notable improvements in the FTA text. First, for incomplete application, the FTA requires the authorities to identify the missing information. In contrast, under the Accountancy Disciplines, the authorities are only required to inform the applicant that the application is incomplete and are under no obligation to help them identify the missing pieces.84 Second, while both require the authorities to inform the applicant reasons for rejecting an application, this is conditional upon a request from the applicant under the Accountancy Disciplines, which is not required under the FTA. Thus, an inexperienced applicant that didn’t make a request for reasons might never be given one under the Accountancy Disciplines, while the same applicant would always know the reasons for rejection under the FTA.   Another notable discrepancy can be found in the MFN provisions. Even though the FTA provision appears to be similar to the GATS provision at first sight, closer examination reveals many holes created by various exceptions.  First, the GATS clause applies to all services sectors, but the FTA clause only applies to sectors listed in Annex 9, which include the following: environmental services; construction and related engineering services; services incidental to agriculture and forestry; engineering services; integrated engineering services; computer and related services; and tourism and travel related services. In particular, for services incidental to agriculture and forestry, China only committed to extend to New Zealand preferential treatment it accorded to members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). While this has been interpreted as reserving China’s rights to accord more preferential treatment to developing countries only,85 it could potentially have a wider scope as WTO Members like Russia, Singapore and Taiwan are also not OECD members.   Second, the MFN obligation under the FTA does not apply to “any measure that accords differential treatment to third countries under any free trade agreement or multilateral 
                                                 
82 Art. VI.3.  83 S/L/64, 17 December 1998.  84 Sec. V. 16. Accountancy.  85 Secretariat Report, para. 75.  
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international agreement in force or signed prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement”.86 This means that the MFN obligation only applies on a prospective basis and doesn’t cover any commitments made in an existing FTA. For example, the better concessions China offered in its FTAs with Hong Kong and Macau will not be extended to New Zealand as they are signed before the New Zealand China FTA. Moreover, the term “multilateral international agreement” is broad enough to include the GATS. Because the GATS was concluded prior to the entry into force of the FTA, it could be argued that even the liberalization commitments made in the Doha Round is excluded from the MFN obligation as well. However, that would probably raise problems under the GATS’s MFN obligation, making it an unlikely outcome.   4. Investment   China and New Zealand have signed an Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (IPPA) in 1988, but that agreement was outdated and now falls far short of the prevailing international standards. For example, the IPPA doesn’t include the national treatment obligation, while the other provisions, such as the MFN obligation and the investor-state arbitration mechanism, are of limited scope. These shortcomings are remedied by the investment chapter in the FTA, which include the following provisions:  A. National Treatment: Both Parties agree to grant national treatment to investments by the investors of the other Party.87 Of note, the obligation only covers activities in the post-establishment phase and doesn’t grant pre-establishment rights to the investors.88 Some commentators suspected that this reservation was made at the behest of China, 89  which has been carefully steering foreign investment into preferred directions through various measures such as the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries.90 However, as the Overseas Investment Act of New Zealand also requires pre-approval for certain investment activities, it is equally likely that New Zealand requested the reservation.91 Existing non-conforming measures are also carved out in an exception, 92  even though the inclusion of a “ratchet-up” mechanism means that such measures cannot be made more restrictive in the future.93  B. MFN: Unlike national treatment, the MFN obligation covers both the pre-establishment and post-establishment activities except the dispute settlement procedures. 94  Also, the obligation does not cover preferential treatments under existing FTAs or multilateral agreements signed by the Parties. 95  Moreover, for 
                                                 
86 Art. 107.2.  87 Art. 138.  88 Id., see also Secretariat Report, para. 74; Paul Comrie-Thomson, Uncertain Opportunities, at p. 9.  89 Paul  Comrie-Thomson, Uncertain Opportunities, at p. 10.  90 See. E.g. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/aaa/201203/20120308027837.shtml. see also, http://www.sbasf.com/index.php/resources1/articles/item/145-establishing-a-foreign-invested-enterprise-in-china.  91 See e.g. NZ answer to Q 19, WT/REG266/3, a p.8.  92 Art. 141.1.a & b.  93 Art. 141.1.c. see also http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/1-Key-outcomes/3-Investment/index.php.  94 139.1 & 2.  95 139.3.  
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fisheries and maritime matters, even future agreements are exempted from the scope of MFN as well.96   C. Fair and Equitable Treatment: Both Parties agree to provide fair and equitable treatment and “full protection and security” to the investment from the other Party “in accordance with commonly accepted rules of international law”.97 The obligation applies to legal and administrative proceedings, as well as the exercise of government authority that affects the investments.98 However, the mere violation of other articles in the investment Chapter does not automatically establish the violation of the fair and equitable treatment obligation.99 Like national treatment, it only covers the post-establishment phase.100  D. Expropriation and compensation: As elaborated by Annex 13, expropriation may be either direct (seizing the property through law or force) or indirect. 101  Indirect expropriation often involves the use of the state’s regulatory power to deprive the investor in substance of the use of its property,102 but unless discrimination or breach of contract are involved, most regulatory actions that may be justified as protecting public welfare shall not be deemed as indirect expropriation.103 In particular, the FTA explicitly states that compulsory license granted in accordance with the TRIPS agreement should not be regarded as expropriation. 104  Expropriation or nationalization is not allowed unless it is for a public purpose, in accordance with applicable domestic law, carried out in a non-discriminatory manner, not contrary to any undertaking which the Party may have given, and on payment of compensation.105 The compensation shall be equal to the fair market value of the investment immediately before the expropriation.106 In addition, the host Party shall provide compensation to investors who suffer losses due to war or riots.107  E. Investor-state: Under Section two of the Investment Chapter, all disputes between the investor of one Party and the other Party shall be settled amicably through consultations and negotiations.108  If such process does not solve the dispute, the investor may choose to submit the dispute to a compulsory arbitration mechanism, unless the state party requests the investor to go through the domestic administrative review procedures first.109 While the dispute may be pursued before the domestic court, the investor must withdraw the court case before it may be submitted to 
                                                 
96 139.5.  97 143.1.  98 143.2 & 3.  99 143.5.  100 143.4.  101 Para. 2.  102 Para. 4.  103 Para. 5.  104 145.5  105 145.1  106 145.2.  107 144.  108 152.  109 153.1 & 2.  
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international dispute settlement.110 For tribunals, the investors may choose either the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").111 While measures affecting services in general are not covered by the Investment Chapter, the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism applies to investment through commercial presence in terms of the following obligations: Articles 142 (transfers), 143 (fair and equitable treatment), 144 (compensation for losses), 145 (expropriation), and 148 (subrogation).112  The mechanism applies to all investments regardless of whether they are made before or after the entry into force of the FTA, unless a particular dispute was already under judicial or arbitral proceedings before the FTA entered into force.113  Also, as the MFN obligation does not apply to the dispute settlement mechanism, investors can only use the mechanism provided under the current FTA even if the concerned state Party provides a better mechanism for a third party.114  F. Intellectual Property  Intellectual property (IP) rights are defined in the IP Chapter as including copyright and related rights, rights in trade marks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits, and rights in plant varieties.115  In addition, the Parties also agree to establish measures to protect genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore, which are of common interests to both parties.116   The Chapter does not create any substantive obligation. Instead, the Parties simply reaffirm their commitment to the TRIPS Agreement and other multilateral IP agreement that both are parties, such as the Berne Convention.117  The bulk of the Chapter is devoted to the procedural obligations, such as establishing contact points, information exchange, cooperation and capacity building. In case of disputes, the Parties may request consultations.118 If consultation fails to solve the dispute, the Party may invoke the dispute settlement mechanism under Chapter 16.119   G. Institutional issues  To facilitate its implementation and administration, the FTA also provides for the establishment of a Joint Committee in Chapter 15. The Committee is tasked with a wide range of functions such as the implementation, review, expansion and interpretation of 
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the FTA.120 It shall meet once per year at the level of senior officials or above. The Committee has been duly established and the first meeting was held in August 2009 in New Zealand.121 As noted by the mid-term review, there has been broad participation in Committee meetings by key agencies from both parties with responsibility for implementation and operation of the Agreement, which includes representatives from respective Customs, Agriculture, Labor, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Economic Development departments. 122  This ensured timely and constructive engagement by relevant experts across the range of issues under consideration by the Committee. 123  The Dispute settlement procedure under the FTA is mostly modeled after that of the WTO. The procedure starts with consultations, which are held on a confidential basis between the two Parties without involvement of third parties. If the dispute fails to be settled at the consultation stage, the Complaining Party may request the establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal. The tribunal shall be comprised ofthree experts who are not government officials of either Party, with the Chair neither a national nor a resident of either Party.  Upon composition, the tribunal shall ask the Parties to make written submissions and conduct one or two hearings. In addition, the tribunal may seek information and technical advice from any individual or body. With such information, the tribunal will be able to make an objective assessment of case, including both the factual and legal issues. The findings of the tribunal shall be set out in a report, which shall be drafted without the presence of the Parties. There are two versions in the arbitral report: the initial report and the final report. Within 90 days (or 120 days in exceptional cases) of the formation of the tribunal, the initial report shall be issued to the Parties for comments. After making necessary revisions by taking into account the Parties’ comments, the tribunal will issue the final report within 30 days of the presentation of the initial report.   If the report finds against the responding Party, such Party shall comply with the findings with a reasonable period of time. If the Responding Party fails to comply, it shall provide compensation to the Complaining Party. When no agreement on compensation can be reached, the Complaining Party may retaliate by suspending concessions under the agreement. In case of any disputes on compliance or suspension of concessions, the Parties may refer the matter to the original tribunal for a decision.   H. Labor, environment and other social issues  Pursuant to the agreement to enhance their cooperation on labor and environment matters, the Parties also signed two side agreements: the Memorandum of Understanding on Labour (MoU) and the Environment Cooperation Agreement (ECA). They were both negotiated and concluded at the same time as the FTA124  but are separate from the FTA.125   
                                                 
120 Art. 180.  121 Mid-term review, Section 14.1  122 Id.  123 Id.  124 http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/5-FAQ/index.php#Labour.  125 Answer to Question 11, CRTA, China-NZ FTA Q &A, WT/REG266/3, at p.5.  
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While they are legally binding, the two agreements do not create many substantive obligations. Instead, they mainly reaffirm the existing commitments of the Parties under the relevant international instruments. They do not prescribe specific regulatory standards and leave to each Party the discretion to set their own policies and national priorities and to set, administer and enforce their own laws and regulations. While a wide range of subjects are listed as possible areas of cooperation, the joint agreement of both Parties is needed before they engage in any specific cooperative activity. The activities may take the forms of exchange of information, visits or joint workshops. Since the conclusion of the two agreements, a number of activities have been carried out by the labor and environmental agencies of both countries.126  Competition is not covered in the FTA as the Anti-Monopoly Law of China only entered force in August 2008 and its administrative structures on competition issues were yet in place.127 Similarly, government procurement is not included either as neither Party has concluded its accession negotiation to the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). 128  However, in a joint understanding concluded along with the FTA, China agreed that it would begin bilateral negotiations on government procurement with New Zealand as soon as possible after it has acceded to the GPA.129    IV. Impact and prospects for future application  The conclusion of the FTA has significantly boosted New Zealand’s exports to China. In 2008, China was only the fourth largest export market of New Zealand with a total export volume of NZ$2.5 billion.130 In 2012, exports from New Zealand grew more than two times to NZ$6.8 billion, making China the second largest export destination of New Zealand (behind Australia). In contrast, China’s export to New Zealand grew at a much slower rate by increasing from NZ$6.4 billion in 2008 to NZ$7.7 billion in 2012.131 The total growth rate over four years is only 20%, which is less than the annual growth rate of New Zealand’s exports to China.   In terms of the export structure, New Zealand’s exports to China concentrate on a few products while China’s exports to New Zealand are much more diversified. As of 2012, for example, the top 20 export items from New Zealand comprises of 87% of its exports to China, while the top 20 imports from China account for only 41% of New Zealand’s total imports from China. Milk powder is the most significant export product from New Zealand from China, as it alone accounts for 30% of New Zealand’s total exports to China.   It is worth noting that the timing of the conclusion of the FTA coincides with the contaminated milk scandal in China which led to widespread distrust of domestic diary brands. As consumers rushed to buy foreign brands, the reputation of New Zealand as 
                                                 
126 Section 13.2, Joint Report.  127 http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/5-FAQ/index.php#competitionpolicy.  128 http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/5-FAQ/index.php#governmentprocurement.  129 Id.  130 Global NZ – International trade, investment, and travel profile 2012, at p. 18.  131 Id, at 32.  
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one of the leading diary producers of the world and the lowered tariff thanks to the FTA together led to the phenomenal growth of the imports of New Zealand milk power. Before the conclusion of the FTA, New Zealand’s dairy exports to China only averaged about NZ$363 million per year.132 After the FTA entered into force, it doubled for two consecutive years: first it rose to NZ$781 million in 2009, then to NZ$1.578 billion in 2010.133 As of 2012, it has reached NZ$2 billion.134 However, the exports might take a hit this year due to the milk powder scandal involving New Zealand-owned Fonterra.135   We can also make another interesting observation by comparing the bilateral trade figures with the global trend. From 2008 to 2012, New Zealand’s export to the rest of the world did not grow much as it only increased from NZ$42.9 billion to NZ$46 billion, with a gain of just 3.1 billion.136 In contrast, its export to China has grown by NZ$4.3 billion over the same period.137 In other words, the export to China not only grew at a much higher rate than the exports to the rest of the world, but also more than made up the shortfall created by the decrease in exports to other major markets such as Australia, US and Japan. This shows that the FTA created real growth for New Zealand’s exports rather than just diverting its exports to other markets into China. On the other hand, while Chinese exports to New Zealand only grew from NZ$6.4 billion in 2008 to NZ$7.7 billion in 2012, it was achieved against the background of a contraction in New Zealand’s imports from NZ$48.5 billion in 2008 to NZ$47.2 billion in 2012. Thus, much of the increase in imports from China was probably the result of replacing imports from other sources, such as Australia, US and Japan, which all saw decreases during the same period. This is probably because the domestic market of New Zealand is quite small and therefore does not offer much room for additional import growth.   The FTA also brought about a steady expansion in services trade both in terms of overall value and diversity of sectors.138 According to the New Zealand government, from 2008 to 2012, its services export to China increased from NZ$686 million to NZ$1 billion; while its services import from China has increased from NZ$269 million to NZ$364 million.139 While the impacts of the FTA on individual sectors are difficult to assess due to lack of sector-specific data, sectors such as tourism and education has clearly benefited from the FTA. For example, during the same period, annual tourist arrivals from China have increased from 112,398 to 197,024.140 Similarly, the number of students from China (including Hong Kong) studying in New Zealand schools has increased from 21,080 to 24,412.141  
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 In contrast, the FTA only had a limited impact on investment. While bilateral investment flows seem to have increased, the volume remains low. For example, as of 2011, total Chinese investment stock in New Zealand is only US$1.87 billion, while the total New Zealand investment stock in China is US$541 million.142 As the data for 2006-2008 are unavailable due to the confidentiality rules of New Zealand Statistics, it is hard to measure the impacts of the FTA on investment.143 In terms of specific sectors, Chinese investment in New Zealand was traditionally in the property and natural resource sectors, but has broadened into other sectors including dairy processing and manufacturing in recent years.144 On the other hand, New Zealand investment in China has traditionally been in manufacturing, leasing and business services.145  So far, no dispute has been brought under the FTA. This is consistent with the approach taken by both China and New Zealand, as neither of them is keen to use the dispute settlement mechanisms under their FTAs. This is unlikely to change in the future.  According to Article 180.1, the FTA shall be reviewed by the FTA Joint Commission within 2 years of its entry into force and at least every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to this provision, the Parties reviewed the FTA in November 2010.146 The review noted that, in general, the operation and implementation of the FTA have been smooth and most of the objectives of the FTA have been achieved. At the same time, the review also identified several areas for further work. These include further customs cooperation, consultations to enhance services trade, consultations to facilitate the movement of natural persons and engagement with business to deepen understanding of FTA provisions and requirements.147  In November 2010, the FTA was also reviewed by the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA). While many Members praised the high coverage of tariff reductions during the review, they also noted that more than 200 tariff lines have been excluded from China’s tariff elimination schedule and some of them are subject to TRQs.148  According to the United States (US), while China’s tariff reductions cover 97.1% of tariff lines, it would only cover 88% of the total import from New Zealand if measured by value.149  China replied by pointing out that the US calculation fails to include duty-free in-quota imports from New Zealand. If they are also counted in China’s final liberalization package, 96.6% of the goods by value imported from New Zealand would become duty-free by 2019.150  This, coupled with the 100% coverage in both tariff lines and import value by New Zealand, probably satisfies the “substantially all trade” requirement under GATT Article XXIV.   
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On the other hand, the FTA’s consistency with GATS seems to be more problematic. As noted by both Australia and EU, the services commitments in the FTA follow closely the Parties’ GATS commitments with only modest new or improved commitments in 7 sectors or sub-sectors.151 In particular, new or improved commitments for Mode 1 were made in only two sub-sectors.152 This raises serious doubt on its consistency with the “substantial sectoral coverage” requirement under the GATS.153 In its response, China stated that its commitments took into consideration the current status of services trade between the Parties. 154  Moreover, China noted that the Agreement was a living agreement and the Parties would review the commitments and explore possibilities for further liberalization in other sectors of mutual interest. 155  However, even though a review was supposed to be conducted in 2010 pursuant to Article 124, no additional commitments on services have been agreed to by the Parties. Given the low level of commitments, it would be hard to argue that the “substantial sectoral coverage” requirement has been met. Of course, due to its consensus decision-making rule, the CRTA probably cannot make a formal finding on the issue.   
                                                 
151 18, 20.  152 Para. 18.  153 Id.  154 Para. 21.  155 Id.  
